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Australian deaf citizens are currently not permitted to perform jury duty, primarily 
due to their inability to hear the evidence and deliberate without interpreters. 
Although interpreters are routinely employed to interpret for defendants or witnesses 
in court, current legal frameworks do not permit interpreters to enter the deliberation 
room as a ‘thirteenth person’, for fear that they may influence the jurors or become 
active participants in the decision-making. Other objections to allowing deaf citizens 
to act as jurors include uncertainty about their ability to participate fully in the 
discussions, the impact the deaf juror’s and interpreter’s presence may have on the 
dynamics of the deliberations and on turn-taking, and the logistics and cost involved. 
Yet, deaf citizens see it as their right to be able to perform this very important civic 
duty, and recent decisions at the international level indicate that excluding deaf 
citizens from jury duty should be considered unlawful discrimination. This paper 
presents results from the analysis of the jury deliberations with one deaf juror and two 
Auslan1 interpreters, and from a focus group discussion with the eleven hearing jurors 
and an interview with the deaf juror about their experience. The jury deliberation is 
one section of a large-scale study on the participation of deaf jurors in a criminal trial 
with Auslan interpreters, in New South Wales.  
 
Key words: Deaf jurors, Auslan interpreters, civil rights, jury deliberations, 
interpreters’ Code of Ethics. 
 
1. Introduction 
The study discussed in this article builds on previous research, which focused 
primarily on deaf juror comprehension of jury instructions (Napier & Spencer, 2008; 
2017), to consider more broadly issues arising from the participation of deaf citizens 
in the trial process, including the impacts of having a deaf juror participate in jury 
deliberations. A key component of this study was the running of a full length mock 
trial, at a New South Wales District Court, in Parramatta, and the monitoring and 
analysis of not only the courtroom interaction but also the jury deliberations.  
To set the context of the study, the paper will outline the legislative and operational 
framework governing jury selection in two selected jurisdictions in Australia, as well 
as some of the regular objections to the inclusion of deaf citizens on juries relevant to 
those jurisdictions.  
The study was funded by the Australian Research Council under its Linkage projects 
scheme with the aim to assess the feasibility of deaf people acting as jurors in 
Australian trials. The project obtained Ethics approval from the University of New 
South Wales Research Human Ethics Committee.2 
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1.1 A contemporary issue 
The participation of deaf citizens as jurors in criminal trials has come to the fore 
recently in Australia following the handing down of decisions in two high profile 
challenges to the exclusion of deaf citizens from jury service in two state 
jurisdictions, Queensland and New South Wales. In April of 2016 the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities found that not providing for the inclusion of 
two deaf citizens in NSW in a jury pool amounted to a failure on the part of Australia 
to fulfil its obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.3 In October 2016, the High Court of Australia handed down its decision 
addressing a challenge brought to the operation of the Jury Act 1995 (Queensland) by 
Ms Gaye Lyons, who had been summoned for jury duty. When summoned, Lyons 
informed the Sheriff’s Office that she would require the assistance of an Auslan 
interpreter to participate on the jury if she were selected. After some correspondence, 
a decision was made to exclude her from the jury pool. Lyons challenged this decision 
under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Queensland).  
Lyons argued that her exclusion was by reason of her disability, and that this 
amounted to prohibited discrimination (Lyons v State of Queensland [2015] QCA 159 
(28 August 2015); Lyons v State of Queensland [2014] QCATA 302 (21 October 
2014); Lyons v State of Queensland (No 2) [2013] QCAT 731). Lyons’ appeal to the 
Queensland Court of Appeal was unsuccessful, as was her subsequent appeal to the 
High Court (Lyons v Queensland [2016] HCA 38 (5 October 2016)). 
1.2 Legislative barriers 
As our study is set in the state of New South Wales (NSW), we will provide an 
overview of the legislative framework in this state, where jury selection and 
management is administered by the Sheriff’s Office, and governed by the Jury Act 
1977 (NSW) (the Act). The Act provides a list of those who are presumptively 
excluded from service, including those who have been convicted of certain criminal 
offences, or are in some way implicated in the administration of justice to such an 
extent that it precludes their participation on a jury. Into this category would fall 
judicial officers, serving police officers, Australian lawyers, as well as those engaged 
in the delivery of legal services in criminal cases, for example through their 
employment by the Director of Public Prosecutions or NSW Legal Aid Commission 
(see Schedule 1 Jury Act 1977 NSW). The Act also allows certain professions and 
carers the right to claim an exemption (see Schedule 2). 
Beyond these categories, ss 14(2) and (3) of the NSW Act allows others to claim an 
exemption, either permanently or for a period, on the basis of hardship, potential 
conflict of interest, or because they are, by reason of a disability, unable to perform 
their function as a juror. Significantly, under s 14(4): 
The sheriff may exempt a person from jury service whether or not on the 
request of the person if the sheriff is of the opinion that there is good cause for 
the exemption. 
Section 14A of the Act then offers further guidance as to what might constitute, ‘good 
cause’ to be excused from jury service, and relevantly provides that a potential juror 
can be exempted by the sheriff if: 
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(a) jury service would cause undue hardship or serious inconvenience to the 
person, the person’s family or the public, or 
(b) some disability associated with that person would render him or her, 
without reasonable accommodation, unsuitable for or incapable of effectively 
serving as a juror, or 
(c) a conflict of interest or some other knowledge, acquaintance or friendship 
exists that may result in the perception of a lack of impartiality in the juror, or 
(d) there is some other reason that would affect the person’s ability to perform 
the functions of a juror. 
Two recent challenges to the operation of the New South Wales legislation, brought 
under the Federal Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Commonwealth), focused on 
the application of s 14(4) and the refusal of the sheriff to provide the potential jurors 
with access to an Auslan interpreter or a closed caption stenographer. In both cases 
the sheriff had based their decision on the fact that the legislation prohibited the 
presence of a thirteenth person in the jury room and that (thus) it was not possible to 
make the accommodations requested. 
Approaching the same issue slightly differently, in Queensland, where the Lyons case 
took place, section 4 of the Jury Act 1995 (Queensland) lists those who are ineligible 
for jury service, including those who are ineligible by virtue of their profession, and 
includes in this section those with a disability:  
s 4 (l) a person who has a physical or mental disability that makes the person 
incapable of effectively performing the functions of a juror; 
The primary reason cited for the ineligibility of the deaf juror by the Tribunal in the 
Lyons case, developed further in the later cases, was that the juror would be incapable 
of effectively performing the functions of a juror, because she would require an 
Auslan interpreter not only in the courtroom, but, critically, also in the deliberation 
room. That a deaf juror would be unable to participate in deliberations independently 
meant that she was unable to discharge her function as a juror.4 The presence of an 
interpreter during the deliberation process necessarily introduced a ‘thirteenth person’ 
into the jury room, and it was this, rather than her disability, that rendered her 
ineligible for jury service. Auslan interpreters work in pairs, so in the case of deaf 
jurors, it would be a ‘thirteenth’ and ‘fourteenth’ persons (see Napier, Spencer & 
Sabolcec, 2007 & 2009, for a review of the limited Australian jurisprudence on this, 
and related issues). It seems to have been assumed by the decision maker(s) in the 
Queensland cases that the common law prevented the presence (and participation) of 
a ‘stranger’ during deliberations. Douglas J, in Re: the Jury Act 1995 [2014] QSC 
113, at [6] goes so far as to refer to an interpreter as a ‘13th juror’. That this is the 
common law position in Australia was confirmed by the High Court in its decision in 
the Lyons case. Equally significant, the courts also pointed to the obligations of 
confidentiality contained in s 54 of the Jury Act 1995 (Qld), and noted that no such 
obligation could be imposed on the interpreter under that legislation in its current 
form. In the absence of express legislative provisions addressing the situation, the 
various decision makers, including those considering Lyons’ challenge were 
 4 
unwilling to authorise the presence of an interpreter in the jury room as a means of 
enabling her to perform her jury service.  
Arguably the approach that is facilitated by the current legislation in most Australian 
jurisdictions is one that proceeds from the expectation that the problem that needs to 
be controlled, or managed, is applications from those seeking to be excused or 
exempted from jury service. Thus to some extent these legislative structures, coupled 
with the decision-making experience and expectations of those involved in jury 
selection and management, has shaped the responses to situations where a deaf citizen 
has sought to remain in the jury pool and remain eligible for selection. It is worth 
noting that in New South Wales, the inclusion in section 14A(b) of the phrase, 
“without reasonable accommodation” points to the need for both the applicant and the 
Sheriff’s Office to consider what might constitute reasonable accommodation (the 
language of anti-discrimination law) such as to enable a person with a disability to 
participate in jury service. By way of comparison, a person who used a wheelchair 
can be (reasonably) accommodated in many contemporary courtrooms, though in 
practice, it is likely that a person with a disability seeking exemption would be 
excused. What seems clear is that the decision-makers are unaccustomed to 
responding to a potential juror who does not seek exemption, but instead presents 
with the expectation that the courts will enable their participation by way of 
reasonable accommodations that extend beyond the relatively simple environmental 
adjustments necessary, for example, to accommodate a wheelchair.  
The experience in Queensland can be compared with Western Australia and overseas 
where deaf citizens do not seem presumptively to be considered either excused (or 
seeking exemption) or excluded from jury service. In 2014 a deaf citizen was 
summoned for jury duty in Western Australia and attended the relevant courthouse 
with an Auslan interpreter. The potential deaf juror was not selected in the ballot to sit 
on the jury, but importantly the potential jury member was permitted to remain in the 
jury pool (Napier & McEwin, 2015). Critically, deaf citizens have also been able to 
serve as jurors in a number of overseas jurisdictions including New Zealand and some 
courts in the United States since 1979 (Napier, Spencer & Sabolcec, 2007; Napier & 
McEwin, 2015).  
Despite the exemplars in Western Australia, New Zealand and the US, the influence 
of the decision in Lyons will be felt in other states and territories in Australia, where 
they have yet to test the eligibility of a deaf person to discharge the role of juror, 
though the issue has been raised in the second major jurisdiction, Victoria (Varnham 
O’Regan, 2014). However, the outcome of the appeal in Lyons, in particular the 
findings in relation to perceived omissions in the Jury Act 1995 (Qld), indicate that a 
specific legislative amendment will be needed in that jurisdiction in order to permit 
the presence of an interpreter during jury deliberations. Further, an accompanying 
shift in policy and approach will be needed to encourage courts and court 
administrators to allow deaf (and blind) citizens to remain in the jury pool and, 
potentially, serve as jurors.  
 
1.3 Other objections to the inclusion of deaf citizens on juries in Australia 
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Going beyond the specific legislative and legal limitations discussed above, 
justifications for excluding deaf citizens to participate on a jury can be loosely 
grouped into two categories. The first relates to concerns that focus on practical and 
administrative or resourcing implications. These are real issues, but ones that cannot 
be addressed directly via this study. The second category includes objections that 
express more substantive concerns, and that are grounded (for the most part) in an 
attentiveness towards possible implications for defendants, and the obligations of 
courts to ensure a fair trial (see generally Hunter et al, 2015). These concerns are 
linked in some respects to the emphasis on the protection of the secrecy of jury 
deliberations.  
An attention to the obligation to provide a fair trial gives rise to questions relating to 
deaf juror comprehension (Napier & Spencer, 2007, 2017), the quality of 
interpretation and translatability of legal concepts from spoken to signed language 
(Napier & Spencer, 2008), interpreter role and responsibilities (Napier & Banna, in 
press) and in particular paralinguistic cues, such as tone of voice, hesitations and other 
nuances that jurors rely on when evaluating admissible evidence entered in a trial. 
These are issues that have been explored with regard to trials where the defendant, 
witness or accused do not understand or use the language of the court and an 
interpreter is required (see for example Berk-Seligson, 1990; Brennan & Brown, 
1997; Hale, 2004/2010, 2014; Russell, 2002). However, the effect of interpreters in 
the deliberation room has never been studied (Napier, 2013; Napier & McEwin, 
2015).  
The research on interpreters in trials has clearly shown that the competence and 
specialist training of the interpreter has a direct impact on the success of the 
interpreted interaction. The higher the level of training the interpreter has received, 
including specialist legal interpreting training, the higher the level of accuracy they 
will achieve in their interpretation (Brennan & Brown, 1997; Goodman-Delahunty et 
al, 2015; Liu & Hale, forthcoming; Russell, 2002; Witter-Merithew & Nicodemus, 
2010), regardless of whether they are spoken or signed language interpreters. The 
higher the level of accuracy of interpreting, which includes accuracy of content and 
manner of delivery, the lower the impact on jurors’ evaluations of the defendant will 
be (Berk-Seligson, 1990/2000; Hale, 2004/2010). Hale’s (2004/2010) research, for 
example, showed that when Spanish interpreters rendered the content and the manner 
of delivery accurately into the target language, there were no significant differences in 
the evaluations of credibility, competence and intelligence of the witness by the juror. 
However, when the content was interpreted accurately but the manner was changed 
(for example from a powerless delivery to a powerful delivery or vice versa), the 
jurors’ evaluations differed significantly. The effect of the mode of interpreting on 
juror perceptions has also shown that simultaneous interpreting produces no 
significant differences as compared with a monolingual situation (Hale et al, 2017). 
This is particularly relevant for Auslan interpreters, as their interpreting is for the 
most part, done in the simultaneous mode.  
The focus of the above cited research has been on interpreting in open court, either for 
witnesses or for the defendant. Such research can be applied to our current study in a 
number of ways: it has shown that trained interpreters can achieve optimum levels of 
interpreting accuracy and that simultaneous interpreting can be less intrusive than 
consecutive interpreting. However, the previous research has limitations in terms of 
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addressing the objections that have commonly been raised to the full participation of 
deaf citizens on juries in Australia.  
One of the key concerns is the expressed anxiety that the interpreter might become an 
active participant in deliberations, or that the presence of additional people will, in 
some way affect the dynamics of deliberations in a negative way (Napier, 2013). That 
is, it might interfere with, or fail to enable, the free and full discussion by all members 
of the jury in deliberations. This may be because the deaf juror is not able to follow 
and participate fully, or it may be because the other jurors feel inhibited in some way 
by the presence of the interpreters and/or the need to communicate via the 
interpreters.  
In particular, the most significant objections to the participation of a deaf juror have 
centred around the implications for jury deliberations, which none of the research to 
date has been able to address directly. Correspondingly, while interpreting in open 
court is challenging, it is nonetheless likely to be occurring in a more controlled 
environment, where the judge or counsel can ask for clarification, can instruct the jury 
or can dismiss the interpreter if inadequate. Such controls are not available in the 
deliberation room, except through the leadership of the Chair. 
1.3.1 Jury deliberations, interpreting and interaction  
Jury deliberations are dynamic, interactive discussions, where jurors engage in 
emotive debate and decision-making about the evidence presented in a trial and the 
potential guilt of the accused. Jury deliberations and decisions can be affected by 
emotional and gender dynamics (Hickerson & Gastil, 2008; Marder, 1987; Thompson 
& Hoggett, 2001), jury size (Kerr & MacCoun, 1985), normative pressures (Tanford 
& Penrod, 1986), and racial composition of juries and trial participants (Sommers, 
2006). Observations of mock jury deliberations have noted that discussion involves 
free-association and is not logical (Winship, 2000), and that it is difficult to guarantee 
the quality of deliberations (Devine et al, 2007). The key to achieving effective jury 
deliberations (and conflict management) is interaction (Poole & Dobosh, 2010). 
A range of spoken and signed language research has established that interpreters are 
adept at mediating interactions between two people, coordinating participation and 
managing turn-taking and overlaps (e.g. Aranguri, Davidson & Ramirez, 2006; 
Cirillo, 2012; Gavioli & Baraldi, 2012; Marks, 2012; Metzger, 1999; Roy, 2000; 
Sanheim, 2003; Wadensjö, 1998). They have found that this is also possible in multi-
party encounters where there are more than two people communicating through the 
interpreter (which means there are typically more interruptions, overlaps and faster 
turn-taking) (Amato, 2007; Takimoto & Koshiba, 2009; Takimoto, 2012), although it 
is more challenging for the interpreters. Van Herreweghe (2002) found that deaf 
people were able to actively participate in a multi-party meeting through interpreters.  
Essentially, interpreters take an active role in facilitating communication, but only so 
far as to ensure that interlocutors understand each other, and not to interject any 
opinion into the discussion. They can manage interaction without necessarily 
impeding it or having any negative impact on it, and the level of their interactional 
management depends on the professional context where they are working. For 
example, in court settings interpreters have less of an interactional management role 
than in medical appointments (Gavioli & Baraldi, 2011). 
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Although they have a role in communication management (see Hale, Goodman-
Delahunty & Martschuk, in press; Llewellyn-Jones & Lee, 2013), professional 
interpreters in Australia are guided by the AUSIT and/or ASLIA Code of Ethics5 in 
relation to their professional and ethical conduct. The main requirements of the Code 
are that professional interpreters interpret everything accurately, that they remain 
impartial and that they do not divulge any information learned during the course of 
their work. These professional ethical obligations are particularly important in the 
courtroom (Hale, 2008; Mikkelson, 2008) and address some of the concerns 
expressed about allowing interpreters into the deliberation room. Professional 
interpreters work in many different settings where highly confidential information is 
discussed, and they are trusted by all parties to maintain professional secrecy. 
Similarly, professional interpreters know that it is not within their role to offer 
opinions or to help those they are interpreting for in any way whatsoever. Courts 
should, therefore, ensure that only professional and competent interpreters who are 
members of the relevant professional association and abide by a professional code of 
conduct, are hired to interpret in court.  
Thus, to date, there is evidence that interpreters can facilitate multi-party interactions, 
that deaf people can participate in multi-party interactions, and that professional 
interpreters are impartial and maintain confidentiality. One deaf juror who had 
experience in both the USA and New Zealand reported that he felt that the jury 
deliberations benefited from having him involved with sign language interpreters, as 
this led to more controlled discussions (Napier, 2013). This can be considered as a 
form of ‘Deaf Gain’ where the presence of deaf people in the world contributes to the 
greater good of humanity, and can also provide tangible benefits to everyday life 
experiences (Bauman & Murray, 2009). But there is no actual evidence of how 
interpreters manage multi-party interactions in a jury deliberation, the extent to which 
a deaf juror can participate in the discussion or whether the presence of sign language 
interpreters in the deliberation room has any negative impact on the interaction. 
1.4 The participation of deaf citizens in the trial process: previous research  
Previous research in Australia, directly concerned with the participation of deaf 
citizens on the jury, has focused on assessing the comprehension of deaf jurors in 
comparison to their hearing counterparts. This research arose in the context of the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission’s inquiry into the participation of deaf 
and blind citizens on juries. The research focused on the translatability of legal 
concepts into Auslan, and assessing the comprehension of key terms and components 
of a trial (Napier, Spencer & Sabolcec, 2007; Napier & Spencer, 2008). Using a mock 
jury, and looking at both their understanding of key legal concepts explained in the 
mock trial materials (in this case the legal elements that support a conviction for 
manslaughter), as well as comprehension of a set of jury directions, the initial 
research and a follow-up study compared the comprehension of the deaf jurors with a 
control group of hearing jurors (Napier & Spencer, 2007, 2008, 2017). 
This previous research indicated that while not all aspects of the trial, including the 
directions, were fully comprehended by the deaf participants, there were no 
meaningful differences between the hearing and deaf participants in terms of levels of 
comprehension. The findings of this research are consistent with research into juror 
comprehension more broadly. That is to say, most research reveals variable, and 
partial, comprehension of critical aspects of the trial process (see for example, 
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Charrow & Charrow, 1979a, 1979b; Dumas, 2000; Findlay, 2001, 2008; Luginbuhl, 
1992; Smith & Haney, 2011).  
So, while some objections that have been raised about the participation of jurors who 
are deaf (or otherwise not able to follow a trial in English without an interpreter) 
centre around the question of comprehension, and a concern that details or 
information will not be able to be translated or interpreted correctly, this concern 
needs to be situated within our understandings of juror comprehension more broadly.  
2. The study 
Because juries deliberate in secret, until this study there was no empirical evidence 
about jury behaviour in a deliberation room when a deaf juror and sign language 
interpreters are present. MacCoun (1990) asserts that mock jury experiments are an 
effective way to examine causal influences on jury behaviour and develop theoretical 
models of the jury deliberation process. Although there have been some criticisms of 
the use of mock juries as a research methodology, it remains one of the most common 
methods used among experimental psychologists (Devine, 2012). Bornstein (2017) 
describes the many advantages of using simulation research, including the ability to 
analyse both the processes and the outcomes of jury decision-making. Furthermore, 
Hale and Napier (2013) assert that, wherever possible, triangulation of methodologies 
should be used to examine professional interpreting research questions from different 
perspectives and to corroborate findings. Therefore, this study comprised four stages:  
1.  Observations of court cases with deaf jurors in the USA and interviews with USA 
court officials; 
2.  A mock trial followed by juror deliberations with a deaf juror and sign language 
interpreters;  
3.  Interviews and focus groups with all the participants: lawyers, judge, witnesses, 
hearing and deaf jurors and interpreters about their experience; and 
4.  Focus groups with key stakeholders to explore perceptions and potential road 
blocks. 
This paper will report on results arising from stages 2 and 3 of the study: with a focus 
on the deliberations and the focus group discussion held with the jurors immediately 
afterwards. 
2.1 The Mock trial  
The mock trial was a re-enactment of a real case that had already been tried in the 
NSW District Court. The offence was related to possession and supply of illegal 
drugs, including statements and documentary exhibits. The trial took place in the 
Western Sydney Trial Court in Parramatta, NSW, and the deliberation was held in the 
deliberation room next to the courtroom, which is routinely used by jurors in real 
trials. The participants included professional experienced legal personnel comprising 
a: Crown Prosecutor; Defence Solicitor Advocate and instructing solicitors from 
Legal Aid NSW; recently retired District Court judge; serving NSW District Court 
Officer; and, two serving NSW Police Officers who acted as informants. Two of the 
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lawyers had appeared in the real case. They were primarily responsible for preparing 
the mock script, adapting it to a shorter duration of one and a half days, and ensuring 
that all personal details were changed to ensure anonymity. The defence witnesses 
were played by professional actors in the roles of the accused and his mother. The 
jury were randomly recruited from jury eligible citizens in NSW through a 
professional recruitment company. Two deaf jurors were randomly recruited with the 
assistance of Deaf Australia, to be present for the duration of the trial. At the end of 
the trial ballots were cast to choose one of the deaf jurors to enter the deliberation 
room. Two professional interpreters worked as a team throughout the trial and 
deliberations. They took 20-minute turns and monitored each other throughout their 
whole interpretations. The interpreters were trained and NAATI6 accredited; one had 
many years of experience in the legal setting and the other was newer to working in 
court but had many years of general interpreting experience.  
2.1.1 Preparations for the mock trial 
The day before the trial, the research team and court participants met in the court to 
go over the logistics of the mock trial, including the position of the audio-visual 
recording equipment and of the interpreters. The interpreters were paid to attend on 
the preparation day to discuss the best position for them in the court and in the 
deliberation room. After some discussion and consideration, the position as shown in 
Figure 1, was adopted for the courtroom. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
2.1.2 Jury preparation 
Before the commencement of the mock trial, the jurors were given a one-page 
briefing note on the role of professional interpreters, and their obligations under the 
AUSIT Code of Ethics to interpret everything faithfully and impartially and maintain 
confidentiality. The briefing also outlined the protocols used in working with 
professional interpreters. At the commencement of the mock trial, the judge gave a 
direction to the jurors about the role of interpreters, their professionalism and their 
needs.  
2.2 Jury deliberations 
At the completion of the 1½ day trial, the twelve jurors (11 hearing and 1 deaf), 
retired to the jury deliberation room to decide on a verdict. They were given two 
hours to come to a verdict. The deliberation was audio and video recorded for later 
analysis. The interpreters were seated facing the deaf juror, as shown in Figure 2. The 
position of the interpreters ensured optimum view for the deaf juror to facilitate 
interaction with the other jurors. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
3. Results and discussion 
This part of the study aimed at answering three research questions:  
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1. Was the deaf juror able to participate to the same degree as the other jurors? 
2. Did the interpreters become active participants in the jury deliberations? 
3. Were the hearing jurors comfortable with the deaf juror and the interpreters? 
 
The data were drawn from an analysis of the turn-taking during the deliberations, a 
focus group discussion with the hearing jurors and an interview with the deaf juror 
(Alex) who participated in the deliberations.  
 
3.1 Was the deaf juror able to participate to the same degree as the other jurors? 
We conducted a quantitative analysis of the number of turns taken by each juror to 
assess their level of participation in the room. In addition, we also measured the 
percentage of the time taken by each participant.  
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
As Figure 3 shows, when we look at juror participation by counting the number of 
turns taken by each juror, we can see that the deaf juror was in the top 5 with 99 turns, 
only after the Chair (with 225 turns), Juror 11 (with 126 turns), Juror 2 (with 125 
turns) and the one dissenting Juror (with 123 turns). As expected, the Chair, who 
needs to offer directives and control the flow of turns, took the highest number of 
turns, and the interpreters were last on the chart, with only one turn. 
 
The interpreter’s sole intervention was not as a juror to offer any opinion on the case 
(see Example 1). It was simply a turn to ensure adequate protocols were followed to 
allow them to perform their job.  
 
Example 1: Turn 34 
Interpreter 2: Excuse me, foreperson, can I just get you to just get one person 
to speak at a time? 
Chair: Yes, yes, sure, sorry. Sorry, continue. 
 
Due to the fact that interpreters were involved, the Chair was instructed to ensure that 
no overlapping speech took place, and that each person waited to be given permission 
to speak by the Chair. Despite these instructions, at turn 34, there was some 
overlapping speech (Example 1). This led to one of the interpreters taking a turn (as 
seen in Figure 3) to remind the Chair that they needed to speak one at a time, as 
interpreters cannot interpret overlapping speech. The next instance of overlapping 
speech occurred at turn 129, as seen in Example 2: 
 
Example 2: Turns 129-136 
 
Male 1: Oh okay] 
Female 4: [I think he was using some for himself as well. I think that was said 
earlier. 
Male 1: [Yeah, that sort of sat in the back of my mind. 
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Chair:  Okay, we need to—we need to have … 
Female 4: [Sorry. 
Chair:  … just one person talk at a time … 
Male 1:  Sure. 
Chair:  … for Alex's sake. 
 
From that time on, there was no more overlapping speech. The Chair did not have to 
allocate turns by giving overt permission to each speaker; instead all the jurors 
became accustomed to the protocol and followed it until the end. It can be argued that 
disallowing overlapping speech for the benefit of the interpreters can be detrimental 
to the free flow of communication between the jurors and interfere with the dynamics 
of the group. It can also be argued, on the other hand, that such ordered protocols can 
be beneficial to all jurors and to the outcome of the deliberations, such as in court to 
ensure an accurate record of proceedings. When overlapping speech is allowed, only 
the loudest and more assertive jurors are likely to be the ones who speak or are heard. 
The pace of the deliberations is also much quicker, which can lead to jurors not fully 
understanding or having enough time to assimilate what is being said by the other 
jurors. This study showed that the hearing jurors did not resent being reminded that 
they needed to wait their turn “for Alex’s sake” (Example 2), and it took them a very 
short time to accommodate the needs of the deaf juror and of the interpreters. 
 
Alex, the deaf juror, on the other hand, expressed some frustration with the turn 
taking. As he states in Citation 1 below, in order to participate he needed to put more 
effort into it, by either putting his hand up or using his voice to interject. He seems to 
resent the fact that hearing jurors were able to “speak up and talk all over one 
another”.  
 
Citation 1: Alex – “They let me participate although every time I wanted to 
say something I needed to raise my hand. I guess that is cultural. Everyone 
else can speak up and talk over one another, whereas I needed to raise my 
hand so that they knew I wanted to say something. I had to be assertive in that 
sense. I started to use my voice to interject, to get their attention, which helped 
with turn taking”. 
 
However, in spite of this statement, the data show that Alex at times also interrupted 
through the interpreters, as can be seen in Example 3: 
 
Example 3: Turn 79 
 
Male 3:    But detective evidence … 
Deaf juror (through Interpreter): [But detective evidence said on average 0.5 to 
     0.4 per cent? Sorry, five to 40 per cent … 
 
To further analyse the level of participation of the deaf juror, we quantified the 
amount of time each juror took when all their turns were combined. Under this 
analysis, we found that the deaf juror was only second to the dissenting juror, taking 
12.32% of the deliberation time (see Figure 4). It must be noted that the interpreting 
was conducted in the simultaneous mode; therefore no extra time was needed to wait 
for the interpretation. Similarly, the interpreters did not need to seek clarification or 




Insert Figure 4 here 
 
 
When Alex got his turn to speak, he took considerably longer than most of the others 
and explained his position in detail, as can be seen in Example 4: 
 
Example 4: Turns 232-235 
 
Female 4: Yep, and also with the money that his mother gave him, the $20,000, 
we don’t know how much extra money that she's holding for him 
either. Anyway, that's … 
Deaf juror (through interpreter): [Well I'm sure that I agree with you, I think that 
there are some areas that we're not sure why the police didn't look into 
it or why they didn't search in the house, but it could have been done. 
We don't know what they did find there and what happened in that 
situation. But if we go back to the point about the actual cash, the 
defence made, for me, a valid point that for a retail, say if you were to 
buy supplies, perhaps drugs, have these things, it's always good to have 
different denominations. People always have different denominations 
in any sort of retail situation and I agree with that in principle. So how 
does the cash actually demonstrate that—how is that an example of 
people purchasing from him? Because it doesn't actually fit with what, 
in my mind what works in terms of—if you go to that party or you go 
clubbing, people will have—they're not going to have 50s and 100s 
necessarily. 
Female 4: Mmm, no. 
Deaf juror (through interpreter): But what the detective—sorry, what Detective 
Evans had said, the value was sort of $40 to $70 and then 100 to 250 or 
whatever it might be, so it just doesn't like … 
 
Our quantitative results indicate that the deaf juror was able to fully participate in the 
deliberations through signed language interpreters as much as the hearing jurors—and 
in this particular case—Alex’s participation was greater than many of the hearing 
jurors. The quantitative results are supported by the comments offered by the hearing 
jurors and by Alex himself. In a focus group with the hearing jurors conducted 
immediately after their deliberation, the researchers asked questions relating to the 
overall research aims.  
 
In discussing the deaf juror’s ability to participate, Juror 1 stated: 
 
Citation 2 – juror 1: “I thought Alex had greater attention to detail probably 
than most of us”. [General agreement] 
 
To which juror 4 responded: 
 
Citation 3 – juror 4: “It was Alex who picked up the wrong information …”. 
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The comments above make reference to an instance where there was an inconsistency 
with one of the dates, due to the changes that needed to be made in order to 
anonymise the details of the case. The only juror who picked up on this inconsistency 
was the deaf juror, which led to a question being sent to the judge for clarification.  
 
The competence of the interpreters was no doubt a major contributor to the deaf 
juror’s full participation. We stress that only qualified interpreters should be engaged 
to interpret for jurors. The hearing jurors commented on how well the interpreters 
must have interpreted and how impressed they were that the deaf jurors were able to 
understand as much as they did, when the information was solely received through the 
interpretation. 
 
Juror 1 stated: 
 
Citation 4 – juror 1: “… when it came to the discussions, it was obvious that 
the information that the deaf jurors had was the same as the information that 
we'd had. They were asking the same questions and putting forward the same 
points and so it seemed very clear that they were getting a good view of the 
information, as good a view of the information as we seemed to”. 
 
The above was supported by Juror 7, who stated: 
 
Citation 5 – juror 7: “In the end I think, for me, when we came to deliberate, 
Alex was so specific of what he heard, but he didn't hear anything. It was what 
was interpreted to him. So everything that had got interpreted was spot on”. 
 
The deaf juror stated in the interview that he thought he was advantaged, rather than 
disadvantaged, because he was deaf: 
 
Citation 6 – deaf juror: “I actually think I was advantaged because I was the 
only deaf person there. They seemed to listen to me more. I mean I had a lot to 
say. I wanted to comment and I was encouraged to do so. For me it was good. 
Maybe because the interpreters were there I tended to dominate”.   
 
3.2 Did the interpreters become active participants in the jury deliberations? 
One of the concerns about allowing interpreters in the deliberation room was that they 
would take on an active role and become extra ‘pseudo’ jurors. The quantification of 
the turns proved this fear to be unfounded, with only one turn taken by one of the 
interpreters to assert the agreed protocol.  The jurors’ comments also indicate that the 
interpreters were only active in fulfilling their role as interpreters, but not as extra 
jurors. They interpreted everything that was spoken to the deaf juror and everything 
that was signed to the hearing jurors. They did not participate in any other way. When 
the interpreters were asked by the jurors to comment on what they thought of the case 
during one of the breaks, Juror 1 commented: 
 
Citation 7 – juror 1: “Yeah, I think it was good for them just to say—and they 
didn't say it in a rude way—they just said, we have a code of ethics, we can't 
really answer that”. 
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The above was supported by jurors 2 and 6 who stated: 
 
Citation 8 – juror 2: “They didn't get involved at all, themselves”.  
 
Citation 9 – juror 6: “I wouldn't even know what their point of view was about 
the case. I don't think they stepped over that boundary or anything”.  
 
Alex, however, found the interpreters’ obligations to their code of ethics to be a 
challenge: 
 
Citation 10 – deaf juror: “It’s very hard for me, how do I say this, to not 
engage in any ‘water cooler’ talk with the interpreters. I had to stave off the 
temptation to do that. I was very conscious of that and it was a real challenge”. 
 
The fact that interpreters need to have regular breaks means that the deaf juror is left 
in isolation during the breaks, unable to communicate with the rest of the jurors. This 
is one real obstacle that may be impossible to overcome, unless a third interpreter is 
hired for the breaks. 
 
Trusting the interpreters’ competence is crucial for all involved in the interpreted 
interaction. As we saw from the hearing jurors’ comments, they fully trusted the 
interpreters’ accuracy. Alex, the deaf juror, was also asked about his impressions of 
the interpreters and whether he trusted them. In response he stated: 
 
Citation 11 – deaf juror: “I think for me, what made me trust them was right at 
the start of proceedings when the judge asked them to take an 
affirmation/oath. They took an affirmation and that gave me confidence that 
they were committed to their work. That act showed me that they were willing 
to take on the role and deliver”. 
 
He also stressed the importance of the interpreters’ level of competence (see Citation 
11), which is a fact that needs to be stressed when referring to any interpreting 
situation.  
 
Citation 12 – deaf juror: “It’s important to consider their skill, qualification, 
experience and the ability to deliver that consistently, and that interpretations 
are delivered as accurately as possible”. 
 
There is very little doubt that interpreters who are unqualified and do not abide by a 
strict code of ethics would not have performed to the required level in such a 
situation.  
 
3.3 Were the hearing jurors comfortable with the deaf juror and the interpreters? 
The last research question addressed the concern about the way the deaf juror and the 
interpreters might impact the other jurors’ level of comfort. During the focus group 
discussion, the hearing jurors agreed that after a short while, everyone learned the 
protocols, became accustomed to working with the interpreters and almost forgot that 
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they were there, a fact that is borne out in our turn taking analysis. This sentiment is 
illustrated in the comment by Juror 1: 
 
Citation 13 – juror 1: “Yeah, I agree with [another juror]. I was surprised, it 
was just so easy and even after just one day, you're so comfortable with the 
people and the interpreters that you start looking at the people rather than the 
interpreters and I was surprised how well it worked and how easy it was … It 
was so natural”.  
 
The above indicates that competent, professional and ethical interpreters do not 
disrupt the flow or interfere with the dynamics of the deliberation room in any 
significant way, contrary to what many had believed at the outset, as expressed by 
Juror 1 below: 
 
Citation 14 – juror 1: “Yeah, I thought it might be distracting … Yeah, just the 
placement of them near the witness and things like that. But it turns out it 
wasn't an issue at all”.   
 
On the same point, Alex commented that: 
 




Citation 16 – deaf juror:  “I know it was a mock trial but I got a taste of what it 
would be like. It was a good and interesting experience … I think everyone on 
the jury learned something new and profound, and that is that it is nice to have 
diversity in the judicial system … there were eleven jurors who will go away 
with a different and positive perspective about deaf people. That’s positive”. 
 
As Alex stated in Citation 16, there were many positive results that arose from this 
study. The preliminary results from the project provide evidence that there was little 
impact on jury deliberations because of the inclusion of a deaf juror. The quantitative 
data proves that the deaf juror was able to fully participate in discussions in the jury 
room and in fact was more communicative than seven of the eleven jurors. The 
qualitative data, largely from observations made by hearing jurors and the deaf juror 
himself, indicate that the deaf juror had an excellent grasp of the evidence of the case 
and displayed a high level of accuracy regarding the factual matrix based on the 
evidence presented to the jury in the courtroom proceedings. In fact, it could be 
argued that there was evidence of ‘Deaf Gain’ (Bauman & Murray, 2009) in that 
having a deaf person present with highly competent interpreters was commented on 
positively and potentially enriched the deliberation process. 
The results allow the research team to answer the first research question in the 
affirmative, that is, the evidence shows that the deaf juror was able to participate in 
jury deliberations to the same degree as hearing jurors. The added significance of this 
result is that it addresses continuing negative preconceptions and misconceptions 
about the ability of deaf people to act as jurors and of Auslan interpreters to fully and 
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accurately interpret everything so that the deaf juror can communicate effectively 
with hearing jurors. This is consistent with previous research, but does underline that 
it is essential to recognise that highly competent professional and ethical interpreters 
were able to effectively remove the communication barrier. However, incompetent 
interpreting will most likely have the opposite effect. It is therefore crucial in these 
circumstances, as in all legal interpreting, that only highly trained professionals be 
hired as interpreters to facilitate communication when a deaf juror is involved.  
The data also addresses the second research question as to whether Auslan 
interpreters become active participants in the deliberations of juries thereby becoming 
de facto 13th and 14th jurors. The qualitative data affirms the professional approach of 
Auslan interpreters in not participating in the substantive discussions of juries outside 
of their role as interpreting the deliberations. Hearing jurors were unanimous in 
observing that interpreters did not allow their own opinions to impact on the 
substance of the interpretation. The fact that hearing jurors did not know the opinion 
of the interpreters regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused and that after a short 
while they spoke directly to the deaf juror and not the interpreter when 
communicating is evidence of the ethical role played by the Auslan interpreters. 
This result allows the research team to answer the second research question in the 
negative. That is, it was clear that the interpreters were not active participants in the 
jury deliberations, and importantly, that they were able to draw on professional 
accountabilities and established communication ground rules to ensure that in the 
event that a juror attempted to draw an interpreter into the conversation this could be 
quickly closed down.  
Finally, in relation to the third question, the results indicated that the hearing jurors 
were comfortable with the presence of the interpreters in the room, and quickly 
became accustomed to mediated communication with the deaf juror.  
At the time of writing this article, analysis is being conducted on the post mock trial 
interviews and the stakeholder focus groups transcripts that will be reported in a 
subsequent paper by the authors. There remain some issues relating in particular to 
ensuring fair trial obligations, as well as resourcing implications within an 
increasingly stretched criminal justice system. Notwithstanding this, the preliminary 
results from the research are positive and show that in reality there is minimal impact 
on the jury deliberation process by having one or more deaf people serve on a jury 
with professional interpreters. The concerns raised by the various state governments 
about the appropriateness and potential negative impact of having deaf people and 
their interpreters present in the court and jury rooms appears to be unsupported by the 
evidence.  
The results from this study have the capacity to inform progressive decisions 
regarding changes in state, territory and federal legislation and conventions so as to 
enable deaf people to serve as jurors using the services of qualified and accredited 
Auslan interpreters (see further discussion in Spencer et al., 2017). Where 
appropriate, it may be necessary for state, territory and federal governments to modify 
courtrooms in terms of layout for better positioning of interpreters to allow deaf 
people to serve as jurors. We acknowledge that such changes will inevitably have 
budget implications. Nevertheless, the results in this study are consistent with the 
recommendations made in the NSW Law Reform Commission Report in 2006. They 
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offer further evidence to support policy and legislative changes to bring Australia’s 
jury selection processes in line with its international obligations, ensuring equality 
among deaf and hearing citizens.  
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